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I. Introduction 
Shareholder activism—using an equity stake in a corporation 
to influence management1—has become a popular tool to 
effectuate social change in the twenty-first century. Increasingly, 
activists are looking beyond financial performance to demand 
better corporate performance in such areas as economic inequality, 
civil rights, human rights, discrimination, and diversity.2 These 
efforts take many forms: publicity campaigns, litigation, proxy 
battles, shareholder resolutions, and negotiations with corporate 
management.3 However, a consensus on scope is lacking. Should 
                                                                                                     
 1. See James Chen, Shareholder Activist, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shareholderactivist.asp (last updated 
June 25, 2019) (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (describing ways in which shareholders 
influence corporate behavior by exercising rights as partial owners) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. See id. (observing some shareholder activists call for social change by 
“requiring divestment from politically sensitive parts of the world . . .[,] greater 
support of workers’ rights[,] . . . [and] more accountability for environmental 
degradation”). 
 3. See, e.g., Courtenay Brown, Wall Street Plays Nice with Shareholder 
Activists, Axios (June 21, 2019), https://www.axios.com/wall-street-activist-
shareholders-pressure-b61aaf76-9442-40fc-a7df-c49132ce3b35.html (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2019) (explaining the various public and private ways shareholder 
activists push for change within companies) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
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corporations change their own operations to reflect a specific 
agenda or use their power to influence society on a much broader 
scale? Distinctions between private and public become blurred in 
light of the ubiquitous and inevitable influence corporations wield 
over third parties. Theoretical absolutes on the 
individualist-communitarian spectrum may underestimate the 
complex co-dependent and co-responsible interrelationship 
between corporations and modern society. Critics may fairly 
question why corporations, arguably society’s most potent 
institutions, should sit idle on problems like civil rights.  
In 1948, as part of the “Proxies Campaign,” James Peck and 
Bayard Rustin each purchased a single share of Greyhound 
Corporation and proposed, albeit unsuccessfully, that Greyhound 
desegregate its bus lines.4 Rustin organized both the 1947 
“Journey of Reconciliation” and the subsequent “Freedom Rides” 
to integrate interstate bus travel in the South; Peck participated 
in both.5 From 1948 to 1955, Peck and others attended the 
Greyhound Company’s annual stockholder meetings to protest and 
to argue for desegregated busing.6 The shareholder activism of the 
“Proxies Campaign” was just one lever in a massive challenge to 
                                                                                                     
 4. See Sarah Haan, Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism: SEC v. Medical 
Committee for Human Rights, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1167, 1214 (2019); Richard 
Marens, Inventing Corporate Governance: The Mid-Century Emergence of 
Shareholder Activism, 8 J. BUS. & MGMT. 365, 371–72, 382 (2002) (chronicling and 
assessing shareholder activism from 1933 to 1953). For background on Bayard 
Rustin, see Eric Pace, Bayard Rustin is Dead at 75; Pacifist and a Rights Activist, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1987, at A1 (obituary). For background on James Peck, see 
Eric Pace, James Peck, 78, Union Organizer Who Promoted Civil Rights Causes, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1993, at B7 (Peck obituary).  
 5. See DEREK CHARLES CATSAM, FREEDOM’S MAIN LINE: THE JOURNEY OF 
RECONCILIATION AND THE FREEDOM RIDES 13–46 (2009) (recounting the “Journey 
of Reconciliation,” a four-state bus tour in which activists challenged 
discrimination in busing and other forms of public transportation); see also 
Interview with James Peck, Eyes on the Prize: America’s Civil Rights Years  
(1954–1965), WASH. U. FILM & MEDIA ARCHIVE (Oct. 26, 1979), 
http://digital.wustl.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=eop;cc=eop;rgn=main;view=text; 
idno=pec0015.0499.082 (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (discussing the origin of the 
Freedom Rides) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 6. See Marens, supra note 4, at 372, 382 (describing how James Peck sued 
Greyhound “to force it to include his resolution [on seating desegregation] in the 
company’s proxy statement” and despite losing this lawsuit, “achieved his real 
goal of publicizing the issue of segregation”). 
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Jim Crow segregation.7 Peck, however, is best known for more 
direct forms of nonviolent resistance and the price he paid in over 
sixty arrests and brutal beatings at the hands of segregationist 
thugs.8 In a sense, Peck’s long legacy of activism reflects the 
virtues of mixed-methods in addressing meta-problems of racial 
segregation. He debated NAACP Director Roy Wilkins, arguing 
that direct action was just as critical as legal procedures in 
winning civil rights.9 
Direct resistance, as exemplified in the Greensboro sit-in, and 
strategies like the “Proxies Campaign” coincided with civil rights 
litigation that would change the course of U.S. history and 
democracy.10 The 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education11 
declared the segregation of public schools unconstitutional, 
                                                                                                     
 7. See generally JOHN LEWIS & MICHAEL D’ORSO, WALKING IN THE WIND: A 
MEMOIR OF THE MOVEMENT (1998) (narrating pivotal events in the civil rights 
movement); CATSAM, supra note 5. 
 8. See Pace, supra note 4 (Peck obituary). 
 9. See YVONNE RYAN & ROY WILKINS, THE QUIET REVOLUTIONARY AND THE 
NAACP 58 (2014). Based on several letters between Wilkins and Peck, Ryan 
notes, 
Peck argued that the court case [ruling state bus segregation was 
unconstitutional] “certainly was not the major [factor] in the 
Montgomery situation. Without the peoples’ protest action, the buses 
would still be segregated, despite the court case—just as interstate 
buses in the South remain segregated despite the Supreme Court.” 
Wilkins rejected Peck’s argument: “Montgomery had a happy 
combination of elements that would make a boycott successful, and 
such a combination does not exist everywhere.” Furthermore, Wilkins 
defended the Association’s reliance on legal action as one of its primary 
means of agitation. 
Id. Peck continued to pressure Wilkins to “take the initiative in pursing boycotts 
and, more importantly, move to expand the sphere of NAACP activities outside of 
litigations and lobbying and embracing the nonviolent protest.” Id. at 77. 
However, “Wilkins simply reiterated his belief that the success blacks had 
experienced in Montgomery was the result of the lawsuit, not the mass action, 
and argued that the threat of white reprisals . . . made the advocacy of actions 
such as boycotts wantonly dangerous.” Id. 
 10. See ALDON MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK 
COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE 13–16 (1984) (analyzing the NAACP’s 
tactics, structure, and role in the civil rights movement); Aldon Morris, Black 
Southern Student Sit-in Movement: An Analysis of Internal Organization, 46 AM. 
SOC. REV. 744, 751 (1981) (analyzing Greensboro’s role in catalyzing the sit-in 
movement across the outhern United States). 
 11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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inspiring, in part, the civil rights movement demonstrations and 
marches of the 1950s and 1960s.12 Brown was not an isolated 
event. It was the product of a “long range, carefully orchestrated 
legal strategy developed in the 1930s by lawyers associated with 
the NAACP.”13 Generally, the NAACP’s attack on segregation was 
two pronged: legal action and persuasion.14 Charles Hamilton 
Houston and Nathan Margold were the architects of the legal 
strategy to dismantle Jim Crow segregation in all aspects of 
American life.15 Litigation by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
(LDF) brought court victories but also served as a method of 
protest independent of court decisions.16  
From a historical perspective, shareholder activism is best 
deployed as one tool among many to advance a modern civil rights 
agenda. The shareholder landscape and level of engagement have 
evolved considerably since the 1950s. The biggest transformation 
is the decline of individual or retail investors and the rise of 
institutional shareholders.17 Individual investors held 
                                                                                                     
 12. See Leland Ware, Deliberate Speed: Implementing Brown’s Ambiguous 
Mandate, DEL. LAW., Spring 2004, at 26, 26 (describing the role Brown played in 
inspiring future protests). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See What Is the Mission of the NAACP?, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. 
FUND, INC., https://www.naacpldf.org/about-us/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) 
The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF) is 
America’s premier legal organization fighting for racial justice. 
Through litigation, advocacy and public education, LDF seeks 
structural changes to expand democracy, eliminate disparities, and 
achieve racial justice in a society that fulfills the promise of equality 
for all Americans. LDF also defends the gains and protections won over 
the past 75 years of civil rights struggle and works to improve the 
quality and diversity of judicial and executive appointments. 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Nation’s Premier Civil 
Rights Organization, NAACP, https://www.naacp.org/nations-premier-civil-
rights-organization/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (outlining the NAACP’s history) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 15. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD 
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 451 (2004) 
(illustrating Margold’s strategy of attacking segregation “as practiced” rather 
than as a purely constitutional concept).  
 16. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 3–7 (2004) (describing victories 
and setbacks in disenfranchisement litigation). 
 17. See generally LISA M. FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER ON 
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approximately ninety percent of the United States equity market 
in 1950.18 In 2009, they held thirty-six percent and the percentage 
continues to fall.19 The individual investor ownership level that 
coincided with Peck’s efforts to influence Greyhound no longer 
exists.20 Instead, institutional shareholders (e.g., mutual funds, 
pension funds, and hedge funds) dominate equity markets.21 For 
example, institutional investors held only six percent of the U.S. 
equity market in 195022 and held thirty-seven percent by 1990.23 
Today, it is estimated that institutional investors hold over eighty 
percent of U.S. equity ownership.24 This change helps to explain 
the transformation from the general passivity of the diffuse, 
rationally apathetic individual shareholders of the 1950s to the 
present-day activism of institutional investors who can surmount 
collective action challenges.25 If willing, institutional investors can 
                                                                                                     
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND PARTICIPATION (2011) (examining shareholder 
activism and analyzing the debate surrounding the propriety of increased 
shareholder power). 
 18. See Alicia J. Davis, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 
1105, 1105 (2009) (analyzing the modern domination of United States security 
markets by institutional investors). 
 19. See id. (adding that trades by individual investors represent less than 
two percent of NYSE trading volume). 
 20. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the 
Institutionalization of the Securities Market, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (“That the 
market for corporate securities traded on the New York Stock Exchange or the 
NASDAQ Global Market is no longer substantially retail in nature is now 
common knowledge.”).  
 21. See Davis, supra note 18, at 1105 (“There is no question that U.S. 
securities markets are now dominated by institutional investors.”). 
 22. See JANICE M. TRAFLET, A NATION OF SMALL SHAREHOLDERS: MARKETING 
WALL STREET AFTER WORLD WAR II 174 (2013) (chronicling the New York Stock 
Exchange’s efforts to broaden the country’s shareholder base during the Cold 
War). 
 23. See Brian Reid, The 1990s: A Decade of Expansion and Change in the 
U.S. Mutual Fund Industry, 6 INV. CO. INST. PERSP. 1, 15 (2000) (explaining 
institutional investor equity ownership). 
 24. See Charles McGrath, 80% of Equity Market Cap Held by Institutions, 
PENSIONS & INV. (Apr. 25, 2017, 11:45 AM), https://www.pionline.com/article/ 
20170425/INTERACTIVE/170429926/80-of-equity-market-cap-held-by-
institutions (last updated Apr. 25, 2017) (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (analyzing 
institutional ownership of companies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 25. See FAIRFAX, supra note 17, at 45–49 (discussing the shift to institutional 
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influence corporate activities and provide additional monitoring. 
However, not all engage in activism and, even when they do, they 
do not engage in the same way. 
This essay offers a historical account of a seminal civil rights 
decision, Belton v. Gebhart,26 in the Delaware Court of Chancery. 
The circumstances surrounding the Belton case illuminate the 
limits and potential of shareholder activism to bolster civil rights 
in the modern context. Examining a historical civil rights example 
is instructive for thinking about how shareholder activism might 
advance the modern civil rights agenda.  
Few modern scholars of corporate law know that Delaware 
was an important battleground in the effort to advance educational 
opportunity for African Americans nationwide and the Delaware 
Court of Chancery’s important role.27 Scholars naturally gravitate 
to corporate cases (e.g., Van Gorkum,28 Disney,29 Caremark,30 and 
Revlon31) without acknowledging the Court of Chancery’s greatest 
decision, Belton v. Gebhart, which had a profound influence on 
American democracy and tells a story every generation of lawyers 
should learn. Two consolidated Delaware Chancery Court  
cases—Belton v. Gebhart and Bulah v. Gebhart—led to the 
desegregation of Delaware public schools and became part of the 
monumental Brown v. Board of Education decision.32 Notably, 
these Delaware cases were the only Brown-related cases where the 
                                                                                                     
shareholder dominance). 
 26. 87 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch. 1952). 
 27. See Matthew Albright, Wilmington Has Long, Messy Education History, 
DEL. ONLINE (June 10, 2016), https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/ 
education/2016/06/10/wilmington-education-history/85602856/ (last visited Sept. 
23, 2019) (describing the history of school desegregation in Delaware) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 28. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 29. In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 30. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 31. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 
1986). See also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); Stone v. Ritter, 911 
A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
 32. See Steven J. Crossland, Note, Brown’s Companions: Briggs, Belton, and 
Davis, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 381, 384–97 (2004) (surveying the pre-Brown 
companion cases). 
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NAACP won at the trial level.33 The major protagonists in this rich 
historical narrative of minority education include the 
philanthropist Pierre S. du Pont, once President of E. I. du Pont 
Nemours and Company and General Motors; Louis Redding and 
Jack Greenberg, legendary NAACP lawyers; and Chancellor 
Collins Seitz, a distinguished jurist on the Delaware Court of 
Chancery.  
Part II of this essay examines the Delaware Court of 
Chancery’s greatest case, Belton v. Gebhart, in its contemporary 
context. Part III examines the key differences between past and 
present civil rights-related shareholder activism. Part IV 
concludes that Belton v. Gebhart, along with its surrounding 
circumstances and events, vividly illustrates that advancing civil 
rights requires a range of tactics that leverage public, private, and 
philanthropic resources. Shareholder activism works best as part 
of a multipronged activist strategy, not as a substitute for other 
types of activism. Recognizing the complex challenges associated 
with advancing civil rights, this essay raises key questions about 
the nascent environmental, social, and governance (ESG) 
framework34 with which scholars, practitioners, and other 
observers must contend.  
II. Chancery’s Greatest Case: Belton v. Gebhart 
A. Historical Background 
Although a tiny state, Delaware is a microcosm of the national 
experience of class, race, and other concerns. It has both northern 
and southern sensibilities.35 The city of Wilmington in the north is 
less than thirty miles south of Philadelphia and resembles other 
                                                                                                     
 33. See Albright, supra note 27 (“Alone among state judges involved in the 
case, Delaware’s Collins J. Seitz ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that 
separate was inherently unequal after personally visiting many schools.”).  
 34. See infra Part III.B.1 (defining ESG framework). 
 35.  See generally BRETT GADSDEN, BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH: DELAWARE, 
DESEGREGATION, AND THE MYTH OF AMERICAN SECTIONALISM (2013) (chronicling 
the three-decades-long struggle over segregated schooling in Delaware, a key 
border state and important site of civil rights activism and white reaction). 
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Rust Belt cities both aesthetically and culturally.36 It is the 
professional and industrial center of the entire state: a hub for 
banks, chemical companies, and corporate lawyers.37 By contrast, 
southern Delaware’s local economy is dominated by agriculture 
and tourism near the coast.38 It is small-town America. It has the 
look and feel of the rural American South.39  
Southern Delaware is part of the Delmarva Peninsula, a 
region encompassing parts of Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia 
and bordered by the Chesapeake Bay to the west and the Atlantic 
Ocean to the east.40 In a sense, its towns, counties, and people have 
more in common with one another than with their respective 
states. James Michener’s novel Chesapeake romanticizes the 
region, which was largely disconnected from the mainland until 
construction of the Chesapeake Bay Bridge in 1952.41 Today, its 
picturesque beaches, wetlands, farms, small towns with Victorian 
homes, and unique cultures make it a popular tourist 
destination.42 However, the local agricultural economy 
significantly restricts career options. Historically and now, 
Delaware’s two southern counties, Kent and Sussex, have the 
                                                                                                     
 36. See About Wilmington, THE CITY OF WILMINGTON, 
https://www.wilmingtonde.gov/about-us/about-the-city-of-wilmington (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2019) (describing the geography and history of Wilmington, 
Delaware) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 37. See id. (noting that Wilmington is an economic, corporate, and 
governmental hub for the region).  
 38. See generally John A. Munroe & Carol E. Hoffecker, Delaware, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (June 13, 2019), 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Delaware-state/Health-and-welfare (last 
visited Sept. 1, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 39. Id.  
 40. See generally Delmarva Peninsula, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Nov. 29, 
2011), https://www.britannica.com/place/Delmarva-Peninsula (last visited Sept. 
1, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 41. See generally JAMES A. MICHENER, CHESAPEAKE (1978); OMARI SCOTT 
SIMMONS, POTENTIAL ON THE PERIPHERY: COLLEGE ACCESS FROM THE BOTTOM UP 
(2018). See also KLUGER, supra note 15, at 426–27 (describing Delaware’s 
geographic and political climate). 
 42. See generally Southern Delaware, SOUTHERN DEL. TOURISM, 
https://visitsoutherndelaware.com/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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highest poverty levels in the state—often higher than the national 
average.43  
Although Delaware was a part of the Union during the Civil 
War, it remained a slaveholding state during the war.44 Its voters 
registered a strongly pro-slavery preference in 1860, picking 
Breckinridge for President over Abraham Lincoln.45 Upstate 
Delaware was dominated by the pre-eminent industrialist Henry 
du Pont, whose company aligned with the Union politically and 
economically, serving as a major supplier of explosives to the 
military effort.46 Delaware’s two southern counties (Kent and 
Sussex), which comprise three-quarters of the state, were 
slaveholding territory.47 They also had enough votes to control the 
state legislature.48 Ironically, the first state to ratify the U.S. 
Constitution refused to ratify the Reconstruction Amendments.49 
                                                                                                     
 43. See CENTER FOR COMMUNITY RESEARCH & SERVICE, AN OVERVIEW OF 
POVERTY IN DELAWARE 2 (2015) (showing that Kent and Sussex Counties have 
higher poverty rates than New Castle County).  
 44. See Samuel B. Hoff, Opinion: Delaware’s Long Road to Ratification of the 
13th Amendment, DEL. ONLINE (Dec. 7, 2015, 12:44 am), 
https://www.delawareonline.com/story/opinion/contributors/2015/12/07/delaware
s-long-road-ratification-13th-amendment/76782210/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) 
(chronicling Delaware history before and after the Emancipation Proclamation) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 45. See Meredith Hindley, The Man Who Came in Second, 31 HUMAN. 6, 20 
(2010) (tracing the career trajectory of American politician John C. Breckinridge 
to illuminate why his personal convictions regarding slavery lost him the 1860 
presidential election); see also KLUGER, supra note 15, at 427 (illustrating 
Delaware’s southern affinities). 
 46. See KLUGER, supra note 15, at 427 (calling du Pont “a strong Lincoln 
man”). 
 47. See id. (observing “the further south one traveled in Delaware, the 
deeper the allegiance to Dixie ways and attitudes one encountered”). 
 48.  See Hoff, supra note 44 (discussing the General Assembly’s rejection of 
emancipation). 
 49. See Hoff, supra note 44 (noting Delaware fought for the Union but 
refused to ratify the Civil War amendments until 1901); see also Justin Wm. 
Moyer, Delaware Apologizes for Slavery and Jim Crow. No Reparations 
Forthcoming., WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/morning-mix/wp/2016/02/11/delaware-apologizes-for-slavery-and-jim-crow-
no-reparations-forthcoming/?utm_term=.e03b6ad708c4 (last visited Sept. 23, 
2019) (describing how the “First State” did not formally apologize for slavery until 
2016, after many other states had already done so) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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The state legislature declared its opposition to all “measures 
intended or calculated to equalize or amalgamate the Negro race 
with the white race, politically or socially . . . and to making 
Negroes eligible to public offices, to sit on juries, and to their 
admission to public schools where white children attend.”50  
After the Civil War, Quakers, Unitarians, and philanthropists 
such as Julius Rosenwald, Booker T. Washington, and George 
Peabody largely bypassed Delaware and concentrated their efforts, 
particularly to advance black education, further south.51 Blacks 
were basically on their own, except for lumber given by the 
short-lived Freedmen’s Bureau between 1866 and 186752 and some 
modest private funding from philanthropic organizations.53 There 
was no regular state support for black schools until 1918.54 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,55 
Delaware amended its constitution in 1897 to require separate 
schools for white and black children,56 but the state lacked both 
internal and external white financial support for black schools 
                                                                                                     
 50. KLUGER, supra note 15, at 427. 
 51. See Robert J. Taggart, Philanthropy and Black Public Education in 
Delaware, 1918–1930, 103 PA. MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 467, 474 (1979) 
(examining the impact of contributions from individual philanthropists like 
Rosenwald on Delaware’s school system); see also KLUGER, supra note 15, at 431 
(describing Quaker involvement in black education). 
 52. See Records of the Field Offices for the District of Columbia, Bureau of 
Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 1865–1870, NAT’L MUSEUM OF AFR. 
AM. HIST. & CULTURE, https://nmaahc.si.edu/object/sova_nmaahc.fb.m1902 (last 
visited July 16, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The 
Freedmen’s Bureau was established by Congress in 1865 to help former slaves 
and poor whites in the south by providing lumber and assistance in the 
construction of homes and schools in the Delmarva area. Id. 
 53. See Taggart, supra note 51, at 468 (mentioning that funding was 
provided by short-lived organizations like the Delaware Association for the Moral 
Improvement and Education of the Colored People, organized by whites in 
Wilmington in 1866 to provide schools for black students). 
 54. See id. (emphasizing the limited support for black education in 
Delaware). 
 55. 16 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 56. See Robert L. Hayman, Jr., A History of Race in Delaware: 1639–1950, in 
CHOOSING EQUALITY: ESSAYS AND NARRATIVES ON THE DESEGREGATION EXPERIENCE 
57–58 (Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Leland Ware eds., 2009) (discussing Article X of 
the Delaware Constitution, which implemented Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate but 
equal” mandate). 
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until 1918.57 While at that time educational opportunity for 
Delaware youth of all races was scant, black students could attend 
only two secondary schools: Howard High School in Wilmington 
and Delaware State College in Dover.58 The former was the only 
school offering a college preparatory curriculum; the latter was 
largely a grammar-level trade school.59 Thus, to obtain a four-year, 
academic, secondary school education, black students had to travel 
to Wilmington in the northernmost part of the state.60 This was an 
impossible task for many black students.61 
Delaware did not have a genuine public school system until 
1921, when a newly-passed education law required an 
“equivalent,” albeit segregated, education for white and black 
students.62 Desperate black residents “had to rely on . . . meager 
property taxes [for school funding that] were [wholly] segregated 
by race.”63  
The success of the effort to establish modern schools in 
Delaware was due in large part to the financial, philanthropic, and 
political efforts of Pierre S. du Pont, Delaware’s premiere 
industrialist.64 A proponent of modern school buildings “as the key 
to a skilled, moral, and responsible citizenry,” du Pont founded the 
Delaware School Auxiliary Association (DSAA) to construct 
schools.65 He contributed a total of $10 million to improve 
                                                                                                     
 57. See Taggart, supra note 51, at 469 (speculating Delaware would have 
received greater investment in black education from northern philanthropic 
organizations following the Civil War had it joined the Confederacy).  
 58. See id. at 468 (indicating the two secondary institutions available to 
black students in Delaware); see also Hayman, supra note 56, at 60 (describing 
the underdeveloped school systems).  
 59. Taggart, supra note 51, at 468. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. See also Hayman, supra note 56, at 60 (noting that “high school 
remained a rare privilege” for black Delawareans). 
 62. See Hayman, supra note 56, at 61 (scrutinizing Delaware’s 1921 public 
school law). 
 63. Taggart, supra note 51, at 469. See also Hayman, supra note 56, at 60 
(observing the state’s contribution to black education in 1890 amounted to “just 
over one dollar per child per year,” and that by 1917 black families paid school 
tax rates three times higher than those of white families and saw few results). 
 64. See Hayman, supra note 56, at 61 (highlighting du Pont’s efforts). 
 65. Taggart, supra note 51, at 470. 
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education throughout the state, and to silence public objections, he 
donated $2.6 million for the construction of segregated schools for 
black students, at no taxpayer expense.66 Du Pont “believed that 
he had stolen one of the most pervasive arguments whites had 
against using public monies for schools: that white money would 
be used for black children.”67 His approach was rather successful. 
In essence, he built the entire black school system without state 
support, establishing over eighty black schools.68 As a negative 
consequence, Delaware’s white citizens did not accept any 
accountability or responsibility for improving black education.69 
Yet without du Pont’s intervention, black citizens would have been 
unlikely to realize anything close to viable structures for decent 
schooling.70 Ironically, these segregated schools would become the 
subject of the litigation in Belton v. Gebhart. 
A major shortcoming of DSAA construction was the lack of 
desire and a plan to construct black secondary schools.71 This void 
in educational opportunity became relevant in Belton v. Gebhart. 
As late as 1950, no public black high school south of Wilmington 
offered a college preparatory curriculum.72  
Higher education among blacks and whites in Delaware 
similarly reflected a sobering pattern of inequity. In 1891, 
following the passage of the second Morrill Act—federal legislation 
to create land-grant colleges—Delaware chartered the State 
College for Colored Students, which eventually became Delaware 
State College.73 Notably, the college did not offer a four-year degree 
                                                                                                     
 66. See Hayman, supra note 56, at 61 (describing du Pont’s many objectors, 
including those who did not want white taxes funding black education). 
 67. Taggart, supra note 51, at 479. 
 68. See id. at 482 (“Du Pont’s efforts . . . increased the likelihood that a black 
youth could become literate in a safe and sanitary school building, taught by a 
reasonably prepared and paid teacher.”).  
 69. See id. (noting that even before 1930 du Pont was complaining to state 
officials that the schools he had built for black students were not being properly 
maintained).  
 70. See id. (“Despite the unfortunate consequences for long-term integration, 
Du Pont’s contributions gave Delaware’s blacks hope for the future.”).  
 71. See id. at 477 (“[DSAA] trustees believed it impossible to build a system 
of high schools for black pupils extending over the entire state.”). 
 72. See id. at 468. 
 73. See id. at 477 (identifying Delaware State as one of the original 
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until 1932 and in 1950 was not nationally accredited.74 
Underfunding by the state was a continuing problem, despite 
contributions from du Pont for new campus buildings.75 Disparities 
between Delaware State College and the University of Delaware 
would become the subject of litigation in Parker v. University of 
Delaware.76 
In 1919, du Pont resigned as president of the family business 
and devoted much of his time to the cause of education, including 
service on the State Board of Education. Prior to his 
school-building efforts between 1919 and 1928, E. I. du Pont de 
Nemours and Company was not associated with racial justice in 
Delaware. In 1926, when the editor of The Afro-American 
newspaper asked du Pont why he had funded these schools, he 
replied:  
If the Delaware experiment proves satisfactory, which I am sure 
it will, it will be a great incentive to go ahead more quickly in 
other States . . . . The progress of Delaware schools will bear 
watching, for on their success must hang the fate of Negro 
public school education in the United States for many years.77  
E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company influenced “Delaware 
as no other private enterprise controlled any other state in the 
Union.”78 Nonetheless, in the 1950s, Delaware’s most liberal 
upstate community of Wilmington still resembled “Topeka, 
Kansas, but a bit worse” from a racial perspective.79  
                                                                                                     
Morrill-Nelson land grant black colleges).  
 74. See Hayman, supra note 56, at 62 (noting that although a large donation 
from du Pont had allowed the school to offer a four-year degree, by 1948 it was 
“so underfunded that it lost its accreditation”). 
 75. See Taggart, supra note 51, at 477–78 (describing du Pont’s contributions 
to the school). 
 76. 75 A.2d 225 (Del. Ch. 1950). Parker noted that the educational 
opportunities between the two schools were not equal. Id.  
 77. Letter from Pierre S. du Pont, Chairman, General Motors, to Carl 
Murphy, Editor, The Afro-American (Mar. 1, 1926) (on file with the Hagley 
Museum and Library, Wilmington, Delaware). 
 78. See KLUGER, supra note 15, at 429–30 (describing the extent to which du 
Pont created Delaware’s corporation-friendly climate). 
 79. Id. at 429. 
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B. Influential Delaware Lawyers Advancing Civil Rights: Louis L. 
Redding and Chancellor Collins Seitz 
Despite the strong corporate influence in Delaware, two 
Delaware lawyers are most often credited with advancing the 
cause of racial justice.  
1. Louis L. Redding 
Louis Lorenzo Redding, a prominent Delaware civil rights 
attorney, represented the plaintiffs in Parker v. University of 
Delaware and Belton v. Gebhart.80 His father, Lewis Alfred 
Redding, was born in rural Kent County, Delaware in 1869, 
attended Howard University, and had a distinguished career as a 
postal service mail carrier and clerk.81 Notably, he was the 
longtime secretary of the Wilmington branch of the NAACP.82 
Louis L. Redding was a product of Delaware’s segregated public 
school system, graduating in 1919 from Howard High School, the 
only college preparatory high school for African Americans at that 
time.83 He subsequently attended and graduated from Brown 
University with honors in 1923 and attended Harvard Law School, 
where he was the only African American in the 1928 graduating 
class.84 In 1929, he became the first African American admitted to 
                                                                                                     
 80. Redding also represented plaintiffs in Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), another influential civil rights case.  
 81. See KLUGER, supra note 15, at 430–43 (reviewing Lewis Alfred Redding’s 
career). 
 82. Id. at 430–31.  
 83. See id. (discussing Lewis Lorenzo Redding’s schooling and early career); 
see also Delaware: Conflict in a Border State, in Separate Is Not Equal: Brown v. 
Board of Education, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM OF AM. HIST. BEHRING CTR. 
(2004), https://americanhistory.si.edu/brown/history/4-five/delaware-2.html (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2019) (chronicling the pre-Brown state of education in 
Wilmington) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 84. See Eric Pace, L.L. Redding, 96, Desegregation Lawyer, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 2, 1998, at C19 (providing an obituary for Redding). 
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the Delaware Bar.85 He remained its only African American 
member until 1956, nearly 27 years.86  
Serving black clients in Delaware during the 1950s won little 
prestige.87 The top legal talent was hired by corporate interests, 
and white lawyers who represented black clients were known to 
charge “extortionate” fees.88 Redding, a man of integrity, did not 
engage in such practices and used his superior training and energy 
to represent black clients. Black Delawareans desperately needed 
his services.89 He fought tirelessly and basically alone to advance 
their civil rights and liberties.90  
2. Chancellor Collins Seitz 
Like Louis Redding, Collins Seitz was a Wilmington native. 
Growing up in a Catholic household, he was a religious minority in 
his community.91 He attended the University of Delaware and the 
University of Virginia Law School before embarking on a 
distinguished legal career.92 He was appointed Vice Chancellor of 
the Delaware Court of Chancery in 1946 at age 31 and Chancellor 
in 1951 at the age of 39.93 His ascendancy at such an early age to 
the country’s preeminent business court is a tribute to his legal 
                                                                                                     
 85. Id. See also Leonard L. Williams, Louis L. Redding, DEL. LAW., Summer 
1998, at 10, 10 (summarizing Redding’s biography). 
 86. See Hayman, supra note 56, at 59–61 (providing details on Redding’s 
life); Pace, supra note 84 (same); Williams, supra note 85 (same). 
 87. Hayman, supra note 56, at 59. See also Frank H. Hollis, My Memories of 
Law Practice in Wilmington, Delaware, DEL. LAW., Summer 1998, at 22 
(portraying the experience of black Delaware lawyers and clients).  
 88. See KLUGER, supra note 15, at 430–31 (describing Redding’s role in the 
Delaware Bar). 
 89. Williams, supra note 85, at 10 (noting that at the time Redding began 
practicing law in Delaware even the courtrooms were segregated).  
 90. See id. (explaining that Redding was not accepted into the Delaware 
State Bar Association until twenty years after he began practicing law and 
practiced his trade “to a large degree in isolation”). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Wolfgang Saxon, Judge Collins Seitz Dies at 84; Refuted Segregation 
in Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1998, at C27 (providing Seitz’s obituary). 
 93. Id. 
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acumen.94 During his twenty-year tenure, he rendered over 400 
reported opinions and garnered national recognition as 
“pre-eminent among the state judges of the nation as the 
consummate arbiter of corporate law.”95 Thereafter, he joined the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, eventually 
becoming chief judge and serving with distinction until his 
retirement.96  
A cursory look at Seitz’s background would not necessarily 
demonstrate a strong commitment to civil rights or “conviction 
that racial segregation violates our constitution,”97 but a deeper 
look suggests otherwise. Collins Seitz “grew up in a wholly 
segregated world; he lived in a white neighborhood, went to 
segregated schools, worked in segregated workplaces, and lived a 
life without social relationships with black persons.”98 According 
to former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, E. Norman 
Veasey:  
To say that Collins Seitz’s background was economically 
humble is an understatement. His father worked for the 
DuPont Company in Wilmington until he became ill in the late 
’20s and died in 1929 just as the Great Depression hit. There 
were no benefits for his mother, the widow, and this was a harsh 
and bitter fact which partly shaped his approach to life. He felt 
the need to be sensitive to the underdog and often to revolt from 
conformity. So he lived a life where the principle of righting 
wrongs became a passion.99  
Seitz was also the first Catholic member of the Delaware state 
judiciary and was likely influenced by the anti-Catholic prejudice 
                                                                                                     
 94. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Collins Jacques Seitz, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 
1279, 1279 (1984) (mentioning that Judge Seitz “crowded brilliant achievements 
in corporate law one upon another”). 
 95. KLUGER, supra note 15, at 432. 
 96. See William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW. 
351, 353–54 (1992) (describing Seitz’s accomplishments as Vice Chancellor and 
Chief Judge).  
 97. Virginia Seitz, Chancellor Seitz’s Perspective on Brown v. Board of 
Education, DEL. LAW., Spring 2004, at 11, 11.  
 98. Id. 
 99. E. Norman Veasey, Collins Jacques Seitz, Paradigm of Principle, 
Passion, Professionalism, and Persuasion, 40 VILL. L. REV. 559, 559 (1995). 
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he encountered as a youth.100 He had demonstrated a commitment 
to racial justice long before Belton v. Gebhart.  
a. Foreshadowing Belton: Parker v. University of Delaware 
In 1950, then-Vice Chancellor Seitz decided a case involving 
his undergraduate alma mater, the University of Delaware, that 
would foreshadow his later decision in Belton v. Gebhart. The 
state’s flagship university did not admit blacks until his 1950 
decision in Parker v. University of Delaware.101 The case was 
initiated when thirty black students at Delaware State College 
applied for admission to the University of Delaware and were 
rejected in 1950.102 Louis Redding of the NAACP represented the 
plaintiffs along with a young Jack Greenberg, who had recently 
joined Thurgood Marshall at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s 
New York City office.103 The Parker decision enjoined the 
University of Delaware from excluding black applicants under the 
separate-but-equal doctrine because Delaware State College and 
the University of Delaware failed to meet Plessy v. Ferguson’s 
equivalency requirements.104 Prior to ordering the University of 
Delaware to admit the black plaintiffs, Seitz personally visited the 
white-serving University of Delaware and black-serving Delaware 
State College and found the latter “grossly inferior.”105 These visits 
led to factual findings that vividly demonstrated opportunity 
discrepancies in terms of physical facilities, curriculum, and other 
crucial features.106 
                                                                                                     
 100. See Seitz, supra note 97, at 12 (describing how Collins Seitz’s childhood 
hardships shaped his attitude towards civil rights). 
 101. See Parker v. U. of Del., 75 A.2d 225, 234 (Del. Ch. 1950) (holding that 
the university’s refusal to consider black plaintiffs’ applications violated the 
Equal Protection Clause).  
 102. See id. at 226 (noting that blacks were not allowed to apply to the 
University if another educational institution within the state offered the same 
course of study); see also KLUGER, supra note 15, at 431–32 (discussing Parker). 
 103. See KLUGER, supra note 15, at 431–32 (discussing NACCP staffing). 
 104. See Parker, 75 A.2d at 230 (explaining “separate but equal” 
requirements). 
 105. Id. at 231.  
 106. See id. at 230–33 (describing Delaware State College’s capital assets per 
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With the Parker decision, Seitz became “the first state judge 
by court order to desegregate a state-financed university at the 
undergraduate level.”107 He made this ruling in a contentious 
climate and could have hampered his professional advancement.108 
Many members of the State Senate disapproved of the “Parker 
decision but also of his many public statements which made known 
with clarity and directness his insistent support of desegregation 
movements.”109 Years later, Seitz would call Parker “an easy case” 
because “to compare the University of Delaware with Delaware 
State College at that time was sort of ludicrous.”110  
b. Public Statements Critiquing Injustice 
Long before Belton v. Gebhart, Collins Seitz had made public 
statements, away from the bench, on contemporary moral issues, 
such as racial justice.111 NAACP Legal Defense Fund lawyers, 
especially Louis Redding and Jack Greenberg, were aware of them. 
In the 1940s, Seitz worked with others to persuade the Catholic 
Church and Delaware society that “racial segregation and racial 
injustice should be anathema to the Church and to any person of 
faith and decency.”112 He wrote for Catholic periodicals and 
performed broadcast editorials on local radio that directly 
confronted racial injustice. A March 5, 1947 editorial broadcast on 
WDEL on behalf of the National Conference of Christians and 
Jews captures Seitz’s commitment and clarity:  
In connection with the Negro problem, can we of the white race 
analyze the reasons for some of the conditions extant among the 
Negroes without ourselves being seriously embarrassed? . . . To 
                                                                                                     
capita, student-faculty ratio, and libraries as inferior to those of the University of 
Delaware). 
 107. Brennan, Jr., supra note 94, at 1279.  
 108. See id. (explaining that Seitz made his ruling shortly before the State 
Senate acted upon his nomination for Chancellor).  
 109. Id.  
 110. Edmund N. Carpenter II, A Conversation with Judge Collins J. Seitz, Sr., 
DEL. LAW., Fall 1998, at 24, 29 (discussing Parker). 
 111. See Seitz, supra note 97, at 12 (describing the anti-segregation editorials 
and speeches Seitz made in the 1940s).  
 112. Id. 
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those who have studied the problem with a real desire to see 
that every individual in this country moves toward a realization 
of the fruits which grow from practicing our theory of 
democracy, the so-called Negro problem is the joint 
responsibility of all citizens who practice democracy and live the 
Ten Commandments. Lip service is not enough.113 
In a March 31, 1948 editorial broadcast on WILM, Seitz 
unequivocally asserted his support for federal civil rights 
legislation: 
All too often we use the excuse that the time is not ripe to justify 
ourselves for not taking some affirmative action requiring moral 
courage. The President’s Committee [on Civil Rights] does not 
and need not apologize for recommending the enactment of 
specific legislation by the federal government for the protection 
of the civil liberties of all of its citizens. Such legislation will be 
tangible evidence to the oppressed that their government  
can—within the democratic framework—make the words “civil 
rights” a meaningful part of their daily lives—not just so many 
empty words.114  
On June 4, 1951, Seitz’s Salesianum High School 
commencement address directly critiqued the lack of moral clarity 
exhibited by societal institutions:  
Many of us would become fighting mad were we told that we did 
not really believe in the great principles of the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution of the United States. Yet I 
submit that too many of us talk out of both sides of our mouths 
at the same time on this important subject. How can we say that 
we deeply revere the principles of our Declaration and our 
Constitution and yet refuse to recognize those principles when 
they are to be applied to the American Negro in a down-to-earth 
fashion? . . . A person has real moral courage when, being in a 
position to make decisions or determine policies, he decides that 
the qualified Negro will be admitted to a school of nursing; that 
the Negro, like the white, will receive a fair trial no matter what 
the public feeling may be; that every Catholic school, church and 
institution shall be open to all Catholics—not at some distant 
                                                                                                     
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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future time when public opinion happens to coincide with 
Catholic moral teaching—but now.115 
Seitz’s commencement address challenged his young listeners 
to exhibit moral courage and acknowledge that the condition of 
black America was the “most pressing domestic issue today in 
Delaware, and in fact the United States generally.”116 Calling 
attention to Delaware’s racial injustice was courageous because 
the State Senate was to act upon his nomination for promotion to 
Chancellor within days.117 At that time, “the Senate remained, as 
it had historically been, in the grip of anti-black downstaters.”118 
Despite Seitz’s firm stance, the Senate approved his nomination.119  
These writings and speeches foreshadowing Belton leave little 
doubt about Seitz’s position on racial segregation. For Chancellor 
Seitz, “racial and religious bigotry are foreign to our theory of 
democracy not only before the law but in our daily social and 
economic contacts.”120 According to Virginia Seitz, her father’s 
perspective was also influenced by his legal training, as he 
revealed in a 1965 address to new members of Phi Beta Kappa: 
We humans do not seem to come by an objective attitude 
naturally. For some psychological reason, once our mind has 
made a judgment or an evaluation, it tends to shield itself from 
ideas which unsettle it in such areas. Thus, true objectivity of 
mind must be consciously cultivated by young and old alike. It 
is a state of mind which welcomes new ideas or formulations. It 
does not raise barriers of intellectual self-contentment or fear of 
the unorthodox.121 
                                                                                                     
 115. Id.  
 116. KLUGER, supra note 15, at 431. 
 117. See id. at 434 (describing Seitz’s confirmation to Chancellor). 
 118. Id. at 432. 
 119. Id. at 434. 
 120. Seitz, supra note 97, at 12. 
 121. Id. at 12–13.  
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For Seitz, clear principled thinking and justice are often 
byproducts of sound legal reasoning.122 As he would later say, 
“desegregation to me was easy.”123 
C. Belton v. Gebhart 
Belton v. Gebhart was actually two, nearly-identical  
cases — the other was Bulah v. Gebhart.124 These two cases, which 
illustrate the persistent educational inequities in Delaware, were 
consolidated into the landmark Brown v. Board of Education 
decision.125 The NAACP brought these two separate Delaware 
cases to test the legality of the state’s segregated public school 
system.126 Both plaintiffs brought suit because their African 
American children had to attend inferior schools127—Ethel Belton 
in Claymont and Sarah Bulah in the town of Hockessin—but Sarah 
Bulah’s situation was unique because she was a white woman with 
an adopted black child.128 Local attorney Louis Redding, who was 
Delaware’s only African-American attorney at the time, argued 
both cases in Delaware’s Court of Chancery with NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund attorney Jack Greenberg.129 
                                                                                                     
 122. See id. at 12 (“He fully embraced the rigor of legal reasoning and the 
habits of mind that it engendered as pathways to the truth—more specifically the 
true meaning of the law.”).  
 123. Carpenter, supra note 110, at 31.  
 124. 87 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch. 1952). 
 125. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 486 n.1 (1954) 
(consolidating Belton v. Gebhart (Delaware), Brown v. Board of Education 
(Kansas), Bolling v. Sharp (District of Columbia), Briggs v. Elliot (South 
Carolina), and Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County (Virginia)); 
see also Hayman, supra note 56, at 3–4 (Brown consolidation); Dolores K. Sloviter, 
Tribute to Collins J. Seitz: A Kind Man, 40 VILL. L. REV. 553, 553–54, 557 (1995) 
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 126. See Belton, 87 A.2d at 863–64 (stating Belton and Bulah’s claims). 
 127. KLUGER, supra note 15, at 434–36.  
 128. See id. (describing the Bulahs’ adoption of their daughter Shirley and 
their struggle to find her adequate schooling).  
 129. See Belton, 87 A.2d at 862 (naming attorneys). 
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The cases were originally filed in U.S. District Court in 
Wilmington but later transferred to the Court of Chancery. 
Delaware’s Attorney General Hyman Albert Young asked that the 
cases be heard in state court because state law was involved.130 
Trying these cases before the Court of Chancery and its recently 
appointed Chancellor was a favorable venue for the NAACP, which 
had previously argued successfully before Seitz in Parker v. 
University of Delaware.131 Moreover, the NAACP was well aware 
of Seitz’s public statements and that his decision in Parker had 
made him, according Louis Redding, “a lot of enemies.”132 The 
NAACP assembled a strong panel of expert witnesses that 
included Frederic Wertham, a leading forensic psychiatrist, who, 
in essence, testified that segregation had ill effects on both black 
and white youth, creating a public health problem.133  
1. The Ruling 
In Belton, Chancellor Seitz held that black schoolchildren 
suffered from state-imposed segregation.134 Although he had no 
power to overrule the separate-but-equal doctrine established by 
the United States Supreme Court fifty-eight years earlier in Plessy 
v. Ferguson, he nonetheless found that the state was not providing 
equal facilities. Chancellor Seitz made the following factual 
finding:  
I conclude from the testimony that in our Delaware society, 
State-imposed segregation in education itself results in the 
Negro children, as a class, receiving educational opportunities 
                                                                                                     
 130. See KLUGER, supra note 15, at 436–37 (describing jurisdictional 
challenges). 
 131. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (describing the holding in 
Parker). 
 132. See KLUGER, supra note 15, at 436–37. 
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Belton, 87 A.2d at 864 (“State-imposed school segregation produces in Negro 
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the Delaware community, . . . the Negro child [feels] that he is inferior because, 
in an indirect fashion, the State has said so.”). 
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which are substantially inferior to those available to white 
children otherwise similarly situated. . . . I believe the 
“separate but equal” doctrine in education should be rejected, 
but I also believe its rejection must come from [the Supreme] 
Court.135 
Seitz’s opinion quoted and paraphrased the expert testimony of 
Wertham, concluding that racial separation “creates a mental 
health problem in many Negro children with a resulting 
impediment in their educational progress.”136 The opinion leaves 
little doubt regarding his belief that segregation per se created 
inequality. However, Chancellor Seitz acknowledged the legal 
limits of his decision and suggested that the U.S. Supreme Court 
re-examine the separate but equal doctrine: 
I, therefore, conclude that while State-imposed segregation in 
lower education provides Negroes with inferior educational 
opportunities, such inferiority has not yet been recognized by 
the United States Supreme Court as violating the Fourteenth 
Amendment. On the contrary, it has been by implication 
excluded as a Constitutional factor. It is for that Court to 
re-examine its doctrine in the light of my finding of fact. It 
follows that relief cannot be granted plaintiffs under their first 
contention.137  
On appeal, Belton influenced the Brown Court’s ultimate 
decision concerning the constitutionality of segregated schooling. 
The following passage from U.S. Supreme Court’s Brown opinion 
bears a striking resemblance to language found in the Court of 
Chancery’s Belton opinion:  
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 
“separate but equal” has no place. Separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the 
plaintiffs and others similarly situated . . . are, by reason of the 
segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of 
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.138 
In Belton, Chancellor Seitz, although upholding the 
separate-but-equal standard in Plessy v. Ferguson, ordered the 
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 138. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
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immediate desegregation of two public schools in 1952, and the 
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed this ruling.139 Seitz’s order was 
eventually affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown.140 
Notably, Belton v. Gebhart was the only Brown case in which the 
NAACP prevailed at the trial level.141 The Delaware Court of 
Chancery, known for its corporate prowess, made a major 
contribution to the cause of American democracy.  
2. The Remedy 
Seitz used the broad, equitable powers of the Court of 
Chancery when he “ordered the immediate admission of black 
children to the white elementary and secondary schools that he 
had found superior in quality.”142 It “was the first time, after a 
finding of inequality, that blacks were admitted at once to white 
schools at the elementary and secondary levels.”143 Seitz would 
later reflect that he “found it inexcusable that the state would lend 
its support to dividing its citizens this way.”144 He rebuked the 
defendant’s position that the state was not ready for desegregated 
education: 
Defendants say that the evidence shows that the State may not 
be “ready” for non-segregated education, and that a social 
problem cannot be solved with legal force. Assuming the 
validity of the contention without for a minute conceding the 
sweeping factual assumption, nevertheless, the contention does 
not answer the fact that the Negro’s mental health and 
therefore, his educational opportunities are adversely affected 
by State-imposed segregation in education. The application of 
Constitutional principles is often distasteful to some citizens, 
                                                                                                     
 139. See Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d. 137, 172 (Del. 1952) (affirming Seitz’s 
order). 
 140. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (concluding that “[s]eparate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal”). 
 141. See Seitz, supra note 97, at 13 (noting the groundbreaking nature of 
Seitz’s ruling). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. KLUGER, supra note 15, at 448. 
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but that is one reason for Constitutional guarantees. The 
principles override transitory passions.145 
Seitz’s clear and fair remedy exhibited both legal and moral 
clarity: 
It seems to me that when a plaintiff shows to the satisfaction of 
a court that there is an existing and continuing violation of the 
“separate but equal” doctrine, he is entitled to have made 
available to him the State facilities which have been shown to 
be superior. To do otherwise is to say to such a plaintiff: “Yes, 
your Constitutional rights are being invaded, but be patient, we 
will see whether in time they are still being violated.” If, as the 
Supreme Court has said, this right is personal, such a plaintiff 
is entitled to relief immediately, in the only way it is available, 
namely, by admission to the school with the superior facilities. 
To postpone such relief is to deny relief, in whole or in part, and 
to say that the protective provisions of the Constitution offer no 
immediate protection.146 
As mentioned, this ruling was the first time a court had 
ordered a segregated white public school in the United States to 
admit black children.147 Thurgood Marshall asserted: “This is the 
first real victory in our campaign to destroy segregation of 
American pupils in elementary and high schools.”148 Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist stated: “In the eyes of many, Chancellor Collins 
Seitz’s 1952 decision in Belton v. Gebhart is the Court of 
Chancery’s ‘proudest accomplishment.’”149 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Belton v. Gebhart 
in Brown v. Board of Education, it took a different direction in 
fashioning a remedy in Brown II.150 After ordering additional 
briefing and argument on the appropriate remedy for segregation, 
it ultimately ordered only that desegregation take place “with all 
deliberate speed” rather than immediately, deviating from the 
approach taken in Belton.151 Specifically, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                     
 145. Belton, 87 A.2d at 864–65. 
 146. Id. at 869–70.  
 147. See KLUGER, supra note 15, at 450–51 (evaluating Parker’s impact). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Rehnquist, supra note 96, at 353–54. 
 150. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II). 
 151. Seitz, supra note 97, at 13.  
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asserted the cases be “remanded to the District Courts to take such 
proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this 
opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on 
a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the 
parties to these cases.”152 This controversial and ambiguous 
language “was used as a device to maintain the [racial] status 
quo.”153 Ultimately, it set back desegregation progress for over a 
decade.154 Ten years after the Brown decision, only 1.2% of black 
students attended schools with whites.155 In five states (Alabama, 
Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina), no black 
students attended white schools.156 In Griffin v. County School 
Board of Prince Edward County,157 Justice Hugo Black concluded 
that “[t]here has been entirely too much deliberation and not 
enough speed in enforcing constitutional rights which we held in 
Brown v. Board of Education.”158 Many southern states did not 
make serious efforts to desegregate until the 1970s.159 Brown II 
also stalled desegregation in Delaware school districts where 
resistance was massive.160  
III. Shareholder Activism: Past and Present 
A. The Past: Corporate Reticence and Separatism 
During the Civil Rights Era, “corporations played the roles of 
passive supporting character, active protagonist, and defiant 
antagonist.”161 Passive support reflected acquiescence to Jim Crow 
                                                                                                     
 152. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301. 
 153. Seitz, supra note 97, at 13. 
 154. See Ware, supra note 12, at 28 (describing white southerners’ campaign 
of “massive resistance” against desegregation). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
 158. See id. at 229 (involving a school board from the original Brown cases 
which closed all of its schools to avoid desegregation).  
 159. See Ware, supra note 12, at 30 (describing delay tactics by southern 
states). 
 160. See id. (lingering impact of resistance to desegregation in Delaware). 
 161. Tom C.W. Lin, Incorporating Social Activism, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1535, 1539 
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and segregationist forces.162 Active companies supported civil 
rights through financial assistance to advocacy organizations such 
as the NAACP, as well as sua sponte desegregation by rejecting 
tradition and accepting African American employees and 
customers.163 Defiant antagonism opposed social activism, actively 
worked against certain groups and causes, and rejected or 
circumvented civil rights legislation and court rulings.164  
For the first half of the twentieth century, most major 
corporations passively acquiesced to Jim Crow segregation, 
avoiding direct engagement with major political and social 
issues.165 However, corporate managers with philanthropic 
interests in black education worked outside of the corporate 
context in a way that resembles modern-day 
“philanthrocapitalism.”166 These managers may have believed that 
                                                                                                     
(2018); see also Joseph Luders, The Economics of Movement Success: Business 
Responses to Civil Rights Mobilization, 111 AM. J. SOC. 963, 965–70 (2006) 
(examining shifting relationships between business interests and civil rights 
activists and highlighting role of disruption costs in social movements); 
Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Radical Repertoires: The Incidence and Impact of 
Corporate-Sponsored Social Activism, 27 ORG. SCI. 53, 55 (2016) (arguing that 
“overt corporate-sponsored activism is inherently riskier than evasive, 
diversionary, or covert tactics”); MARK PRENDERGRAST, FOR GOD, COUNTRY AND 
COCA-COLA: THE UNAUTHORIZED HISTORY OF THE WORLD’S MOST POPULAR SOFT 
DRINK 280–87 (2000) (scrutinizing Coca-Cola’s evolving positions on 
desegregation during the Civil Rights Era).  
 162. See Lin, supra note 161, at 1541 (describing how many businesses 
“served as passive characters reluctantly thrust into the history books” during 
the civil rights movement).  
 163. See id. at 1542 (describing large corporations and smaller black-owned 
businesses that spearheaded integration efforts).  
 164. See id. at 1542–43 (businesses undermining integration). 
 165. See id. at 1541 (“Rather than explicitly support or oppose the Civil Rights 
Movement, . . . many businesses of the time . . . simply decided to passively 
uphold the misguided, inhumane ways of the Jim Crow South.”).  
 166. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 
1954–1963 32–33, 395 (1989) (highlighting the role corporations played in the 
Civil Rights Act’s passage); CLAY RISEN, THE BILL OF THE CENTURY: THE EPIC 
BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 63–73, 247 (2014) (considering Southern 
businesses’ role in demanding an end to the Jim Crow Era). For a discussion of 
philanthrocapitalism, see Aaron K. Chatterji & Barak D. Richman, 
Understanding the “Corporate” in Corporate Social Responsibility, 2 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 33, 34 (2008) (discussing corporate decisionmaking in advancing 
progressive causes); Janie A. Chuang, Giving as Governance? 
Philanthrocapitalism and Modern-Day Slavery Abolitionism, 62 UCLA L. REV. 
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taking unpopular public positions would alienate customers 
impacting the bottom line. For example, Julius Rosenwald, 
longtime president of Sears & Roebuck Company, engaged in 
significant philanthropic efforts to promote the cause of black 
education in the first half of the twentieth century in the South.167 
But his efforts remained largely unknown to Sears customers and 
the public at large.168 His name was never prominently featured in 
the famed Sears catalog during his tenure as president, and 
although he and Aaron Nusbaum acquired a significant stake in 
the company, they retained the Sears & Roebuck name.169 This 
name remained intact long after Rosenwald and Sears bought out 
Nusbaum in 1903 and Sears’ retirement from the company in 
1908.170 Some observers speculate that Rosenwald’s reluctance to 
become a more public face at Sears was a response to the 
anti-Semitism potentially harbored by the company’s midwestern 
farmer customer base.171 Irrespective of the reasons, corporations 
favored passivity and separatism, and this stance greeted 
shareholder activist demands regarding civil rights in the first half 
of the twentieth century.172 
                                                                                                     
1516, 1518 (2015) (exploring the rise of philanthrocapitalism in addressing 
antitrafficking policymaking). 
 167. See PETER M. ASCOLI, JULIUS ROSENWALD: THE MAN WHO BUILT SEARS, 
ROEBUCK AND ADVANCED THE CAUSE OF BLACK EDUCATION IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 
93–96 (2006) (memorializing Rosenwald’s philanthropic efforts, including the 
construction of 5,300 “Rosenwald schools” for black children in the rural South). 
See generally STEPHANIE DEUSTCH, YOU NEED A SCHOOLHOUSE: BOOKER T. 
WASHINGTON, JULIUS ROSENWALD, AND THE BUILDING OF SCHOOLS FOR THE 
SEGREGATED SOUTH (2011) (chronicling Rosenwald’s partnership with 
Washington in the era preceding the civil rights movement). 
 168. See ASCOLI, supra note 167, at 74–75 (speculating that few Sears 
customers knew much about Rosenwald). 
 169. See id. at 74 (observing that Rosenwald’s name did not appear on the 
Sears catalog from 1909 to 1924). 
 170. See id. (“[Rosenwald] wisely realized that to tamper with the name of the 
company . . . would be a serious marketing mistake.”). 
 171. See id. (explaining that while Rosenwald’s name and Jewish identity was 
frequently mentioned in news stories, Rosenwald may have believed that his 
rural customers would not see those publications).  
 172. See id. at 74–84 (describing Rosenwald’s extensive philanthropy 
campaign and how it was carried out separately from the Sears, Roebuck brand); 
see also Lisa M. Fairfax, From Apathy to Activism: The Emergence, Impact, and 
Future of Shareholder Activism as the New Corporate Governance Norm, 99 B.U. 
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B. Modern Times: The Rise of Institutional Shareholders 
and Activism 
Since the Civil Rights Era of the 1950s and 1960s, domination 
of the equity ownership landscape has been transferred from 
diffuse, rationally apathetic individual investors to institutional 
investors, who have greater capacity to influence civil rights.173 
The big question is willingness.  
Today, in wealthy capitalist societies, “[t]he public corporation 
is usurping the state’s role as [perhaps] the most important 
institution in wealthy capitalist societies” through which “the vast 
majority of economic activity is organized.”174 This emergence has 
coincided with a greater role in social activism. New information 
technology and social media amplify activist demands and engage 
businesses whether they like it or not.175 Now more people expect 
businesses and executives, particularly at public companies, to 
engage with critical social issues, and corporate executives are 
more exposed to public view.176 A range of external threats, 
                                                                                                     
L. REV. 1301, 1311 (2019) (“Directors and officers clearly viewed shareholder 
apathy as preferable to shareholder activism or influence.”). 
 173. See Davis, supra note 18, at 1105 (tracing how institutional investors 
have come to dominate the market); see also Fairfax, supra note 172, at 1314 
(“[I]ndividual shareholders . . . have continued to be apathetic even as 
institutional shareholder activism has increased significantly.”). 
 174. Gabriel Rauterberg, The Corporation’s Place in Society, 114 MICH. L. 
REV. 913, 913 (2016); see also C. A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social 
Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 77, 139 (2002) (“Corporations remain today, as they were in the 
1920s, the most powerful nongovernmental institutions in America. In 
innumerable ways they shape the nation’s politics and culture, and the lives of 
their employees and consumers.”).  
 175. See Lin, supra note 161, at 1545–46 (recognizing social media’s power to 
affect companies’ branding and stock prices while noting that “a bad viral video 
or negative trending hashtag” may also draw the attention of regulators).  
 176. See id. at 1546  
The days of simply ignoring social issues or writing a check are gone 
for many large businesses. Corporations are now frequently expected 
to engage in social issues through public statements, sponsorships, 
partnerships, and policies supporting a position or a cause. 
Increasingly, businesses are expected by their communities, 
consumers, employees, and executives to engage in social activism on 
issues directly or indirectly related to their core operations.  
(footnotes omitted). 
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including political intervention and public opinion, conspire to 
influence corporate actions.177 
1. Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Factors 
In socially responsible or impact investing, environmental, 
social, and governance (ESG) factors guide decisionmaking. ESG 
concerns, such as human rights and climate change, have a 
non-shareholder constituency character, but, as a practical matter, 
they are not divorced from traditional corporate metrics and 
shareholder value because these criteria may also have financial 
relevance.178 Although initially resisted by investors, ESG 
investment is estimated at twenty trillion dollars in assets under 
management (AUM), or one-quarter of all AUM worldwide.179 
Forbes Magazine describes the growing importance of ESG: 
In 2018, thousands of professionals from around the world hold 
the job title “ESG Analyst” and ESG investing is the subject of 
news articles in the financial pages of the world’s leading 
newspapers. Many investors recognize that ESG information 
about corporations is vital to understand corporate purpose, 
                                                                                                     
 177. See DAVID VOGEL, LOBBYING THE CORPORATION: CITIZEN CHALLENGES TO 
BUSINESS AUTHORITY 225–26 (1978) (describing the combined impact of public 
opinion and government action). 
There is a way in which corporations can be forced to make decisions 
not dominated by the logic of capital accumulation, but it cannot be 
achieved through “corporate accountability.” It requires the direct 
intervention of the government. At best, corporate activists can 
supplement government regulation; what they cannot do is substitute 
for it. . . . The corporate challenge movement has not and, indeed, 
cannot adequately address these fundamental issues because they can 
only be addressed through the governmental process.  
Id. 
 178. See George Krell, The Remarkable Rise of ESG, FORBES (July 11, 2018, 
10:09 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgkell/2018/07/11/the-remarkable-
rise-of-esg/#40d82d851695 (last visited July 16, 2019) (noting corporate response 
to ESG factors like climate change, water conservation, worker protection, and 
supply chain management have direct financial relevance) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 179. Id. 
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strategy and management quality of companies. It is now, quite 
literally, big business.180 
The new wave of corporate social activism is influenced by 
three forces: convergence of the public-private spheres, evolution 
of corporate social responsibility efforts, and expansion of 
corporate political rights.181 An array of mechanisms is used to 
lobby corporations: impact investors, social impact ratings, 
regulators, customers, social media, and public demands.182 In this 
climate, corporations are also choosing direct action. They are 
assessing their own ESG profiles and considering risks alongside 
other traditional performance metrics. Savvy corporate managers 
exercising their responsibilities must consider how ESG factors fit 
into business strategy and respond to pleas from impact investors 
and the public to engage with them.183 They can communicate 
through annual reports, proxy statements, ESG-based reports, and 
branding campaigns. Ignoring ESG could lead to negative business 
outcomes in the current environment. 
Critics contend ESG factors are too ambiguous or 
insubstantial and camouflage empty corporate promises, cosmetic 
actions, and routine disclosures.184 However, state corporate law 
                                                                                                     
 180. Id.  
 181. See Lin, supra note 161, at 1558 (analyzing the roots of new corporate 
social activism).  
 182. See id. at 1544 (“[N]ew social media and financial technologies have 
dramatically changed the means and ends of corporate social activism in ways 
previously unimaginable.”). 
 183. See J. P. Dallmann, Impact Investing, Just a Trend or the Best Strategy 
to Help Save Our World?, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2018, 7:49 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jpdallmann/2018/12/31/impact-investing-just-a-
trend-or-the-best-strategy-to-help-save-our-world/#e670c1875d11 (last visited 
July 5, 2019) (“[I]mpact investors are far more proactive in their intention for 
positive impact as opposed to merely avoiding the negative impacts.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 184. See, e.g., ESG Beyond Greenwashing, CITYWIRE (Sept. 6, 2018), 
https://citywire.co.uk/wealth-manager/news/esg-beyond-greenwashing/a1152166 
(last visited July 16, 2019) (“Today greenwashing [falsely touting a company’s 
products or policies as environmentally-friendly] has become more sophisticated, 
aided by the lack of a universal definition over what constitutes good corporate 
behavior and consequently, what are eligible investments. This ambiguity plays 
into the hands of companies purporting to exhibit ESG-friendly practices.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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remains steadfast in terms of its own priorities. The Honorable Leo 
E. Strine, Jr. makes clear that: 
[d]espite attempts to muddy the doctrinal waters, a clear-eyed 
look at the law of corporations in Delaware reveals that, within 
the limits of their discretion, directors must make stockholder 
welfare their sole end, and that other interests may be taken 
into consideration only as a means of promoting stockholder 
welfare.185  
Decisions pertaining to ESG do not differ much from other 
decisions subject to the business judgment rule,186 provided some 
impact on, or link to, shareholder value is identifiable. Such 
decisions “might include how corporations respond to climate 
change, how good they are with water management, implementing 
effective health and safety policies to protect against accidents, 
managing supply chains, [and] how they treat their workers.”187  
                                                                                                     
 185. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed 
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the 
Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 768 (2015). 
States have created social enterprises such as public benefit corporations to better 
address stakeholder concerns. See, e.g., Omari Scott Simmons, Judging the Public 
Benefit Corporation, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW 
354 (Benjamin Means & Joseph W. Yockey eds., 2018). 
 186. Robert Clark describes the business judgment rule as the principle that 
“the business judgment of the directors will not be challenged or overturned by 
courts or shareholders, and the directors will not be held liable for the 
consequences of their exercise of business judgment—even for judgments that 
appear to have been clear mistakes—unless certain exceptions apply.” ROBERT 
CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.4, at 124 (1986); see also FRANKLIN A. 
GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 278–79 (2000) (“The idea underlying the rule is that 
courts should exercise restraint in holding directors liable for . . . business 
decisions which produce poor results or with which reasonable minds might 
disagree. This seems to be a sensible notion. After all, business decisions typically 
involve taking calculated risks.”).  
 187. Krell, supra note 178. See also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate 
Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005) (arguing corporate 
social responsibility initiatives are permitted pursuant to the broad discretion 
under Delaware law); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), overruled by 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (analyzing the business judgment 
rule’s protections). 
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2. Corporate Power and Accountability 
In their seminal book The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means “addressed two 
dimensions of corporate power: (i) the internal minimization of 
agency costs resulting from the separation of ownership and 
control between diffuse shareholders and executives; and (ii) the 
external abuse of corporate power at the expense of society 
at-large.”188 The first dimension has dominated the corporate 
governance debate in the United States, whereas the latter has 
received less acceptance from U.S. scholars.189 It reflects a populist 
uneasiness with concentrations of corporate power coupled with a 
lack of accountability for negative externalities and broader 
stakeholder concerns.190 Overall, accountability remains the 
                                                                                                     
 188. Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of 
Executive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 333 n.199 (2009); see also 
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 11–13, 17–18 (1932) (examining the consequences of 
separation of corporate ownership and control).  
 189. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for 
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439–41 (2001) (asserting the most prominent 
global corporate governance paradigm is shareholder wealth maximization). But 
see FAIRFAX, supra note 17, at 680 (defining “stakeholder” as any group of 
individuals impacted by corporate actions, regardless of whether such group 
desires corporate profit maximization); Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as 
Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of 
the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1274 (1999) (asserting corporate 
decisions often implicate non-shareholder concerns); Cynthia A. Williams, 
Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 705, 716 (2002)  
The progressive alternative, which is derived from the stakeholder 
theory of the corporation, suggests that corporate managers’ 
underlying social obligations are more extensive than maximizing 
shareholders’ wealth within the confines of the law. Specifically, 
progressive scholars contend that directors . . . ought to consider the 
implications of their actions on employees, consumers, suppliers (in 
some cases), the community, and the environment. 
 190. See Simmons, supra note 188, at 333. Historically, the scholarly 
discussion of the role of the corporation in society can be traced to the  
Berle–Dodd debate of the 1930s. See generally BERLE, supra note 188, at 11–13, 
17–18; E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); see also Wells, supra note 174, at 78 (“Legal debates 
over corporate social responsibility stretch from the 1930s to the twenty-first 
century.”). 
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threshold issue in corporate governance, encompassing both 
internal and external dimensions.191  
“For Adolf Berle, checks on a corporation’s economic power 
include[d] competition, profits, political intervention, and public 
consensus or sentiment.”192 He observed: 
[A] modern American corporation understands well enough that 
it has a “constituency” to deal with. If its  
constituents—notably its buyers—are unsatisfied, they will go 
to the political state for solution. Hardly any present-day board 
of directors or corporation management would take the position 
that it could afford to disregard public opinion—or would last 
very long if it did.193  
He further notes that “[t]he corporation is now, essentially, a 
nonstatist political institution, and its directors are in the same 
boat with public office-holders. If ever corporate managers base 
their continued tenure on power and not on reason, the end is 
disaster.”194 His characterization of corporate power as the 
primary issue in corporate governance raises questions concerning 
who is and who should be a corporation’s targeted audience.  
“Adolph Berle and other commentators described the modern 
corporation as a major social institution rivaling 
government[s].”195 Without question, it “touches virtually every 
aspect of contemporary life,” yet it does not necessarily reflect the 
accountability and democratic procedures that most citizens expect 
                                                                                                     
 191. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 192. Simmons, supra note 188, at 330; see also ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH 
CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 39, 54, 58 (1954) (arguing that public opinion is 
a check on the power of corporations).  
 193. See BERLE, supra note 192, at 56–57 (arguing that public opinion is a 
check on the power of corporations). 
 194. Id. at 60.  
 195. Simmons, supra note 188, at 337 n.224; see also Norton E. Long, The 
Corporation, Its Satellites, and the Local Community, in THE CORPORATION IN 
MODERN SOCIETY 202, 202 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959) 
The large corporation takes its place along with the church and the 
armed services as an organization that transcends the local territory 
and cuts across political boundaries, at times even those of the nation 
and state. For some of the members at least, the corporation represents 
a value-laden institution that outranks the local community as a focus 
of loyalty and a medium for self-realization. 
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from government.196 In light of its complexity, modern corporate 
study should not be limited to legal analysis, but rather embrace 
the social sciences—politics, economics, history, sociology—to 
capture the full scope of its impact.197  
Modern society is witnessing a public-private convergence 
blurring traditional lines and spheres of influence between the 
private sector and government.198 As these lines collapse, activists 
seek influence beyond avenues of government and public policy to 
include business and corporate policy.199 Despite growing citizen 
demands for public accountability, commentators argue this 
perspective is problematic:  
The notion of the corporation as a public institution or private 
government is both informative and misleading. It is 
informative in that it illuminates the extent to which the social 
impact of the corporation does resemble that of a government. 
But it is deceptive to the extent that it obscures the inability of 
the corporation to command compliance with its decisions. The 
reason that a corporation, unlike a democratically elected 
government, cannot be politically accountable to those affected 
by its decisions, is because the most important decisions made 
                                                                                                     
 196. Simmons, supra note 188, at 337. Berle’s observations were not unique:  
The corporate accountability movement represents an attempt to 
realize in practice what scholars such as Latham, Dahl, and others 
have argued in theory—namely that corporations wield the power of 
governments and should, therefore, be treated like governments. The 
movement is accurately described as a movement for corporate 
accountability because its basic thrust is to make corporate officials as 
responsive to those affected by their decisions as are elected officials. 
By reviving the symbols and mechanisms of corporate  
governance—the annual meeting, the annual report, the proxy 
resolutions, the board of directors—the advocates of corporate 
accountability are attempting to make the relationship between the 
officials of the private sector and the public resemble more closely that 
between government officials and their constituencies. 
VOGEL, supra note 177, at 6–7 (1978). 
 197. Simmons, supra note 188, at 337 n.226. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Foreword, 
in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 195, at ix, ix–xi. 
 198. See Lin, supra note 161, at 1558–59 (considering the corporate adoption 
of government objectives once believed to be beyond the reach of markets). 
 199. See id. at 1561 (arguing that activists will seek to change not only laws 
and public policies, but also “institutional practices and priorities at major 
corporations”). 
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by any firm are out of the control of those who govern it; they 
are dictated by the imperatives of a market economy.200 
Another observer elaborates on the public-private distinction: 
Shareholders frequently choose to be part of a corporation; 
many citizens do not choose to be part of a country. 
Shareholders in a corporate democracy that disagree with the 
corporation’s actions and values can readily sell their shares; 
citizens of a democratic society cannot readily leave their 
countries without incurring significant costs. Given the 
differences between political democracies and corporate 
democracies, democratic moral values should not be supplanted 
by corporate market values.201  
Despite blurred lines between the public and private spheres, 
certain distinctions remain and should be considered when 
assessing the efficacy of shareholder activism in advancing civil 
rights. Ideally, the public, private, and nonprofit sectors operate in 
a mutually reinforcing state of symbiosis rather than antagonism. 
C. Efficacy of Shareholder and Corporate Activism Versus Other 
Democratic Mechanisms in Protecting Minority Rights 
The enthusiastic embrace of shareholder activism as a tool to 
bring about broad social change is a welcome development. It 
reflects a trend of outsourcing public functions and values to 
private actors202 and stems in part from a frustration with interest 
group politics and existing democratic processes in the public 
context.203 However, overreliance on shareholder activism and 
similar private tactics may lead to an expectations gap; they are 
not an effective surrogate for persistent, organized, mobilized 
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social movements that employ diverse tactics in traditional 
democratic venues.204 Lessons from the civil rights movement 
suggest broader systemic change will require sustained, combined 
pressure from other institutional, social, and public actors. 
Shareholder activist attempts by Bayard Rustin and James Peck 
to change Greyhound’s segregative practices were not 
successful.205 Court victories that gave plaintiffs a legal hook 
reflect how democratic institutions—judicial, legislative, 
executive—may broadly signal social change and inspire greater 
activism.206  
1. Modern ESG Activism Compared to Past Civil Rights 
Movement Activism 
What does civil rights activism look like in the modern era? 
How does the earlier Civil Rights Era compare with today’s ESG 
landscape? While civil rights fall under the umbrella of human 
rights, today’s ESG landscape is much more expansive, extending 
to economic rights,207 voting rights, housing,208 jobs, and 
healthcare209 and encompassing discrimination based on gender, 
sexual orientation, disabilities, and immigration status.210  
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Shareholder activism is largely a top-down, indirect approach, 
whereas Civil Rights Era activism reflected bottom-up tactics with 
persistent demands and protests to effectuate change throughout 
society.211 Tactics included litigation,212 education,213 direct 
protest, civil disobedience,214 shareholder activism,215 
self-defense,216 and other spontaneous and planned individual and 
group initiatives.217 Activists executed a multipronged attack on 
all aspects of segregation in every aspect of life: public 
accommodations, education, housing, and employment.218 Civil 
rights advocacy organizations like the Congress of Racial Equality 
(CORE), Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and the 
NAACP LDF developed ambitious long-term strategies, 
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coordinated efforts, and amplified the demands of marginalized 
minority groups.219 Such strategies and tactics have served as 
blueprints for advancing other movements.220 By contrast, the 
question remains whether impact-investor activism and the ESG 
emphasis will engender an enduring commitment to civil rights 
and inspire significant ground-level and broader public changes 
beyond the corporations themselves. 
Another important question concerns who has the 
responsibility to ensure whether corporations implement social 
aims internally and externally. Who assesses the quality and 
effectiveness of execution? Who follows up over time? Should these 
tasks rest with the corporations themselves via private ordering, 
or is more robust outside oversight needed to achieve ESG aims? 
The systemic societal impacts of shareholder ESG activism are 
uncertain because the ESG framework operates largely within a 
paradigm that relies on the private market to right public 
wrongs.221 It tilts largely toward private autonomy versus public 
accountability. Some critics might argue that overemphasizing 
shareholder activism, within this context, actually weakens 
demands for government solutions and limits government 
accountability for correcting major social problems like civil rights 
injustices.222 At the extreme, it may decrease public spending on 
services and divert resources from vulnerable groups.223 
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Shareholder activism as a form of civil rights advocacy is perhaps 
a symptom of an illness—declining state support, political 
gridlock, and voter disenfranchisement. In an environment of 
deregulation, privatization, and political gridlock, people may look 
toward corporations for quicker answers and greater agency.224 
Recognizing the influence of corporations, shareholder demands 
are a pragmatic strategy, yet without other approaches they will 
have limited systemic impact on such meta-problems as civil 
rights.225  
2. Ownership and Representativeness 
Roughly fifty percent of U.S. citizens do not own a single share 
in a company, directly or indirectly.226 Equity ownership may not 
reflect preferences of non-equity holders and the public. Activist 
investors, largely composed of labor unions, mutual funds, 
individuals, pension funds, and hedge funds (in which pension 
funds are often invested) may reflect more affluent and elite 
preferences.227 Further, one scholar suggests that “because the 
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distribution of popular ownership of corporations over-represents 
wealthier and higher income households, decisions made through 
shareholder voting may be less reflective of social welfare than 
decisions made through more broadly democratic bodies, and 
therefore likely to be only a second-best solution.”228 Many 
institutional investors engage in tepid to moderate social activism. 
The impact investor community is smaller and ostensibly acts as a 
proxy for broader interests,229 but its composition is 
overwhelmingly homogenous from a race and class perspective.230 
The lack of representativeness and diversity inevitably creates 
blind-spots.231 Planning for vulnerable groups is not the same as 
planning with them. 
3. Majoritarian Politics Disfavors Vulnerable Minorities 
Context matters, and the status of majoritarian politics can 
influence the success of shareholder activism in the civil rights 
arena. In theory, highly polarized majoritarian politics that 
overwhelmingly disfavor minority rights may render shareholder 
civil rights activism less effective.232 Greyhound and other 
companies during the Civil Rights Era did not immediately change 
their policies in response to the Proxies Campaign.233 Common 
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excuses for certain businesses and municipalities’ acquiescence to 
segregation were economic; that is, lost revenues and alienation of 
their white customer base.234 They were effectively claiming that 
they were not racist, but a majority of their customers and 
constituents were. And they often discounted the power of the 
black purse. Charles Hamilton Houston of the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund thought economics and financial strain would 
eventually aid the cause because public actors might go bankrupt 
when forced to meet the equalization requirements of Plessy v. 
Ferguson.235 The impact of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, which 
brought Martin Luther King, Jr. to national prominence, was 
economic236—about 70% of Montgomery bus passengers were 
African American237—and James Peck argued that segregation 
had negative economic consequences because Greyhound 
customers, who experienced segregation, would bring expensive 
lawsuits.238 Civil rights activists were right about both the 
economic and societal costs. Segregation was neither rational, 
morally justified, nor economically sensible.  
4. Mixed Motives 
Impact investors still want financial returns along with their 
social influence.239 These mixed motives reflect conflicts. The basic 
formula—shareholder return on investment equals financial 
return plus social impact—hides complications. How much 
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financial return do investors want and are they willing to tolerate: 
one percent, five percent, ten percent? Should businesses prioritize 
social impact or financial concerns? An intertemporal perspective, 
allowing companies to prioritize financial concerns at one time and 
social concerns at another, may be prudent. The former may 
potentiate the latter.  
5. Definitional and Measurement Challenges 
Despite desiring a social impact, investors may have difficulty 
defining and measuring it. For example, what does social impact 
related to civil rights look like? Does it change representation at a 
specific company or industry-wide, including directors, the c-suite, 
employees, suppliers, products, and advertising? Alternatively, is 
it about company financial support or sponsorship for advocacy 
organizations that work to advance minority rights? 
Methodologies for determining social impact and ESG ratings are 
emerging but without a consensus.240 Perhaps a preferred 
standard will emerge from proxy advisers like Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis.241 However, advisory 
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firm guidance and ratings have been criticized for their sometimes 
tenuous link to corporate performance,242 and these critiques are 
likely to intensify in the context of ESG questions.243  
IV. Implications 
The Civil Rights Era legacy of Belton v. Gebhart and the noble 
efforts of Louis Redding, Jack Greenberg, Chancellor Collins Seitz, 
Pierre S. du Pont, Bayard Rustin, and James Peck illustrate that 
advancing civil rights requires a range of tactics that leverage 
public, private, and philanthropic resources. Shareholder activism 
will work best as part of a multipronged strategy, not as a 
substitute for other types of activism. It is certainly bold in the 
sense that it seeks a recalibration of corporate institutional 
arrangements and priorities. It is prudent in recognizing corporate 
power and its ability to influence society as well as the limitations 
of other advocacy venues. On the other hand, even if shareholder 
activists can help to advance the modern civil rights agenda, their 
willingness to do so remains uncertain. 
The history and legacy of Belton v. Gebhart reveal the complex 
challenges associated with advancing civil rights. Modern 
scholars, practitioners, stakeholders, and observers must consider 
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key questions about shareholder activism and civil rights, 
particularly with respect to the ESG movement:244 
1. Who measures ESG impact and how? 
2. Is the desired impact related to a specific corporation’s 
operations or broader systems or both? 
3. Is ESG largely a disclosure-based regime, consistent with 
the market paradigm? 
4. Is ESG simply one activist tool among many? 
5. Do we want greater public accountability through 
traditional democratic bodies than shareholder activism 
offers? 
6. Does ESG as presently conceived downplay or enhance the 
importance of democratic venues for activism? 
Future research on these important questions and others will 
deepen our understanding of ESG-related shareholder activism 
and its potential to advance civil rights in the contemporary 
context.  
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